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In many settings, economic outcomes depend on the competence and effort of the
agents involved, and also on luck. When principals assess agents’ performance they can
suffer from attribution bias by gender: male agents may be assessed more favorably than
female agents because males will be rewarded for good luck, while women are punished for
bad luck. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether principals judge agents’
outcomes differently by gender. Agents perform tasks for the principals and the realized
outcomes depend on both the agents’ performance and luck. Principals then assess agents’
performance and decide what to pay the agents. Our experimental results do not show
evidence consistent with attribution bias by gender. While principals’ payments and
beliefs about agent performance are heavily influenced by realized outcomes, they do not
depend on the gender of the agent. We find suggestive evidence that the interaction
between the gender of the principal and the agent plays a role. In particular, principals
are more generous to agents of the opposite gender.
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1 Introduction
In many economic settings, outcomes depend on dispositional factors such as effort and abil-
ity, as well as on situational factors, such as luck. This creates room for attribution bias.
In psychology, attribution bias is the tendency for people to under-emphasize situational
explanations for outcomes while over-emphasizing dispositional explanations (Ross, 1977).
Attribution bias by gender is understood as the tendency of observers to attribute successes
to ability for males and to luck for females, while also attributing failure to luck for males
and to ability for females (Deaux and Emswiller, 1974). Two strands of literature in social
psychology have investigated attribution bias by gender. One has focused on how men and
women differ in accounting for their own successes or failures, and has found that men are
more likely to attribute their own successes to ability while women are more likely to attribute
their failures to ability (McMahan, 1982; Stipek and Gralinski, 1991). The other strand stud-
ies attribution of success and failure for others, and has found mixed evidence on whether
observers are more likely to attribute men’s success in some tasks to ability or more likely
to attribute their failures to luck, compared to women (Hill and Augoustinos, 1997; Ra¨ty
et al., 2002). While this literature has not focused on cases where outcomes realized by the
individual being evaluated affect the payoff of the individual making the evaluation, recent
empirical evidence in economics suggests that attribution bias by gender may be at work in
such contexts. These include referrals to surgeons after the death of a patient (Sarsons, 2019),
executive pay in the finance sector (Selody, 2010), firing of corporate executives (Landsman,
2019), and punishment for misconduct (Egan et al., 2017). However, many other variables
may be at work in these real-world environments that cannot be controlled for – these in-
clude agents’ real contributions to outcomes, prior experience, and unobserved characteristics,
among others. It is not possible to completely rule out factors other than attribution bias
that might drive these differences in outcomes by gender.
In this paper, we present evidence from a laboratory experiment in order to test for
the presence of attribution bias by gender in a controlled environment. A lab experiment
provides a controlled setting in which other factors are unlikely to influence participants’
behavior. In particular, we employ a principal-agent setup. Participants in this experiment
are first randomly divided into two roles: principals and agents. In each round (out of 20),
they are randomly matched into pairs. Agents perform a task for their principals in each
round. Principals are rewarded based on the outcome of the agents’ performance, while
agents are paid by their principals after the outcome is revealed. Importantly, whether the
outcome produced by the agent takes a high or low value is not a deterministic function
of the agent’s performance. It also depends on a random component. In each interaction,
principals are shown information that allows them to identify the agent’s gender. This piece
of information is conveyed through agents’ (nick-)names, and presented along with other
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demographic information in order to minimize demand effects. After each interaction, we
elicit agents’ and principals’ beliefs about the agents’ performance.
Our main tests follow from the concept of attribution bias by gender. That is, following
a high outcome, we test whether principals are more likely to attribute it to the agent’s
ability if male, while to luck if female. This would result, in turn, in greater payments being
made to males relative to females conditional on a high outcome. Similarly, we test whether
principals attribute a low outcome to the agent’s luck if male and to the agent’s ability if
female. Thus, again we test whether female agents receive lower payments as compared to
male agents conditional on a low outcome.
Our experimental results do not show evidence of attribution bias by gender. While
principals’ payments are heavily influenced by the realized outcomes, they do not differ by the
gender of the agent. Similarly, principals’ beliefs about agents’ performance do not differ by
gender, although they are heavily influenced by the realized outcomes. Our results, therefore,
suggest that gender is not a driving force when principals assess the agents’ performance,
at least in a laboratory environment. We do, however, find evidence that the interaction
between principal and agent gender affects payment decisions. In particular, principals pay
higher wages to agents of the opposite sex.
We show that our results are robust to including session fixed effects and round fixed
effects, to restricting the sample to the first ten rounds of the experiment, to discarding the
first five rounds from the sample, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable.
We provide evidence that principals did treat payments as relevant, that they were aware
of the gender of the agent, that principals’ prior beliefs did not differ by agent gender, that
our results are unlikely to be due to sample selection, and that payments were not driven by
agents’ ages.
1.1 Contribution
How individuals attribute causes of behavior and outcomes to both dispositional and situ-
ational factors has received considerable attention in social psychology. In particular, the
fundamental attribution error, the tendency of observers to assign too much weight to dis-
positional factors (e.g., preferences and ability) and too little weight to situational factors
(e.g., constraints and luck) when interpreting others’ behaviour and performance, has been
the focus of several studies (e.g., Jones and Harris (1967), Moore et al. (2010),Ross (1977)).
Here, however, we are interested in a specific manifestation of this bias: attribution bias by
gender. Evidence in social psychology, for example, shows that observers are more likely to
attribute good performance of males to skill and females to luck in certain tasks. Parents and
teachers too have been shown to suffer from attribution bias (Deaux and Emswiller, 1974;
Dweck et al., 1978; Espinoza et al., 2014; Fennema et al., 1990; Yee and Eccles, 1988). We
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contribute to this literature by testing whether attribution bias by gender exists in a gen-
eral framework. First, our design features variation in tasks, and so we can study whether
gender-biased attributions are task-dependent. Second, our principal-agent setting allows us
to mimic a variety of real-world environments such as workplaces and educational institu-
tions. Our experiment explicitly controls for the output-generating process, and so isolates
the dispositional and situational factors affecting the resulting outcome.
Experimental and applied work within economics has emphasized gender differences in
preferences (risk and ambiguity, competition, social preferences, negotiation, among others)
as possible explanations for differences in economic outcomes such as income, education,
and types of occupation (Flory et al., 2014).1 However, a vast literature also shows that
discrimination contributes to differences in labor market outcomes by gender at several stages,
including screening, hiring, and promotion.2 Taste-based discrimination (Becker, 2010) and
statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972) have been widely studied (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).
Individuals who anticipate discrimination may change their own behavior, intensifying group
differences along dimensions such as productivity (Glover et al., 2017), self-beliefs (Beyer,
1998; Keller, 2001) and perceived performance (BenYishay et al., 2020). Another mechanism
that has been put forward to explain differences in economic outcomes is that of attribution
bias. Sarsons (2017) shows, for example, that women are given less credit for group work
than men. Other examples, cited above, come from the markets for surgeons, executives,
and financial advisors (Sarsons, 2019; Selody, 2010; Landsman, 2019; Egan et al., 2017).
Complementary to these studies, we develop an experiment where there is uncertainty about
an individual’s contribution to output and explicitly model the uncertainty, which is known
to principals in our setup. We further elicit principals’ beliefs. Thus, we are able to perform
a clean test for attribution bias by gender.
A large literature emphasizes the importance of stereotypes and their influence on judge-
ments about performance or ability (Alan et al., 2018; Bordalo et al., 2019; Carlana, 2019;
Coffman, 2014; Coffman et al., 2019; Milkman et al., 2013). In particular, this literature
finds that stereotypes about tasks lead to biased judgments about others’ and own ability to
perform gender-incongruent tasks. Women performing male-typed tasks and men performing
female-typed tasks are expected to perform worse than the opposite gender. To understand
whether stereotypes also drive attribution bias by gender, we introduce variation in tasks
performed by the agents.
1See Bertrand (2011) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a review.
2See Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) and Bertrand and Duflo (2017) for a review.
4
2 Experimental Design
An experiment that studies attribution bias by gender requires several ingredients. First,
it requires two roles: an agent whose performance is to be evaluated, and a principal who
evaluates the agent’s performance. Second, the outcome of the agent’s performance needs
to be a function of both dispositional and situational factors. Third, the principal must be
aware of the gender of the agent. Our design features all these pieces.
A detailed description of the experiment is presented below. First, we asked participants
to fill out a demographic questionnaire. Second, we randomized participants into two roles:
principals and agents. In each of the 20 rounds, agents and principals were matched into pairs
using the stranger-matching protocol.3 The agent then performed a task for the principal. The
agent’s performance influenced the resulting output, but not deterministically. This output
determined the principal’s earnings in that round. The principal then proceeded to pay the
agent for his performance. In each round, we elicited agents’ and principals’ beliefs about
the agent’s contribution to the realized outcome. Finally, subjects were asked to complete a
series of questions about the experimental task.
2.1 The Experiment
At the outset of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a demographic question-
naire that included information about their gender, field of study, level of study, country and
state of origin, age, caste, and religion. Participants were then randomly assigned into one of
two roles: principals and agents. They were informed that these roles were fixed for the whole
duration of the session, that the experiment consisted of two tasks, and that the tasks would
be played one after the other and for ten rounds each.4 We then explained to our participants
the structure of a round. While the general features of each round were read aloud by the
experimenter, we asked participants to read the specific details on their computer screens.
To make sure participants understood the experiment, we encouraged them to ask questions
if anything was unclear and we asked them to complete a set of comprehension questions.
Participants could not continue with the experiment until they had answered all questions
correctly.
2.1.1 Description of a Round
In each round, principals and agents were matched into pairs following the stranger-matching
protocol.5 Participants were informed that, although they could earn money in each of the
3That is, at every round principals and agents were randomly rematched.
4In two sessions, participants played 9 rounds per task, rather than 10, due to time constraints.
5We opted for the stranger-matching protocol since it avoids reputation building and related strategic
concerns.
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20 rounds, at the end of the experiment only one would be randomly selected to count for
the final payments.
Agent’s performance and output produced At the beginning of each round, the agent
performs a task, consisting of a fixed number of questions. These are to be performed in 45
seconds. The agent’s performance determines the lottery that is assigned to the principal.
Each lottery has only two possible outcomes: High and Low output. The agent’s performance
(i.e., the number of correctly solved questions) affects the lottery assigned to the principal by
increasing the probability that the high output is realized. However, even in the case an agent
had solved all questions correctly, there is a positive probability that the resulting output is
low.
Principals’ payments Once the 45 seconds have passed, the principal is shown the real-
ization of the lottery, which constitutes her payoff for that round (i.e., the output produced
by the agent). Importantly, the principal is not informed about the number of questions
solved correctly by the agent. However, the principal is fully aware of the mapping between
the number of correctly answered questions and the probability of high output. The principal
proceeds by choosing a reward for her agent. In particular, the principal is given access to a
pot of |350 and she is free to choose how to divide this amount between her agent, a random
agent in the session, and the experimenter.6 This separate pot is independent of the realized
outcome in that round. Importantly, the agent does not see the payment he receives until the
end of the session. In this way, his performance is not dependent on the history of payments
he has received, and the principal’s payments will not be driven by an underlying motive of
incentivizing the agent to perform well.
Principal’s beliefs After the payment decision, we elicited the principal’s beliefs about
the performance of the agent. In particular, we asked the principal to indicate the number of
questions that she thought that the agent had solved correctly. We incentivized this question
by paying |50 if the answer was correct. In some sessions we also asked the same question,
but did so while the agent was performing the task and so before the outcome of the lottery
was realized. That is, we asked the principal to indicate her prior belief about the number
of questions that the agent would solve correctly. Finally, we also asked the principal two
unincentivized questions. We asked the principal to guess how many questions she thought
6At the time of the experiment, this amount corresponded to £3.92 (exchange rate as of July 2018: £1.00
= |89.21). We implemented this payment procedure following the same considerations as in Gurdal et al.
(2013). In particular, two features are worth noting. First, not allowing the principal to keep any unassigned
money for herself shuts down any (financial) incentive for the principal to keep all the money. Second, having
the option to also pay a random agent allow us to eliminate any efficiency motives (in terms of subjects versus
experimenter considerations) that the principal might have.
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that the agent attempted, and a hypothetical question on whether she would like to be paired
for another round with the same agent.
Agent’s beliefs We asked the agent three unincentivized beliefs’ questions. First, we asked
him to guess the number of questions that he solved correctly. Second, we asked him to guess
whether the principal earned the high or low output. Finally, we also asked him his belief
about the percentage of the |350 that he would receive from the principal.
2.1.2 Debriefing
Finally, after the two tasks have been completed, we asked participants to answer two sets
of questions. First, we asked participants to guess our research questions. Second, we asked
participants questions about the previous tasks. For instance, we asked them what task they
thought as more difficult (out of the two) and whether the agents were anxious or stressed
while performing the task; and, similarly, whether the principals were anxious or stressed
while the agents were performing the task.
2.2 Gender Information
In each round, while the agent was performing the task, the principal was shown some de-
mographic information about the agent. In particular, the principal was given information
about whether the agent was a university student, the agent’s age, and the agent’s gender.
We disclosed gender information of the agent through the means of nicknames. That is, in
each round the computer software would assign a gender-congruent nickname to the agent.
As the experiment took place in India, the realized nickname was randomly selected from a
list of popular Indian names. Since we used only first names, they did not signal caste. All
names were the most popular Hindu names. For instance, female names included “Akansha”,
“Neha” and “Priya”, while for male names these included, among others, “Amit”, “Ashish”
and “Nitin”.7
The use of nicknames instead of a direct statement of the agent’s gender was implemented
to mask the fact that our research question was gender-related and, therefore, to prevent
potential distortions due to demand effects and social desirability concerns. Moreover, we
opted for nicknames as opposed to real names because we wanted to preserve anonymity
and control more carefully for the type of information disclosed via names. For instance, we
wanted to make sure that names did reveal the gender of the agent, and that they did not
prime religion or caste-related information.
7Showing other religious groups or full names would have primed religion and/or caste.
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2.2.1 The Tasks and Output
In each session agents performed two different tasks. However, since we vary these tasks
across sessions, we have a total of four tasks: a math task, a Raven task, an effort task, and
a memory task. We now provide a description of each of these tasks.
The math task We implemented a variation of the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) math
task. In each round of this task, agents were asked to perform 7 additions. Each addition
consisted of three two-digit numbers.
The Raven task In each round of this task, agents were asked to solve three Raven Matri-
ces. In particular for our experiment, we implemented the matrices from the Raven Advanced
Progressive Matrices (APM). This test is commonly used to measure fluid intelligence (Car-
penter et al., 1990).
The effort task For this task we used a variation of the Abeler et al. (2011) effort task.
In this task, agents were shown ten 5×5 matrices that were randomly filled with zeros and
ones. Agents were asked to solve as many grids as possible by counting the number of ones
in each matrix.
The memory task This task was a working memory exercise. In particular, agents were
shown 16 common English words (e.g., cat, umbrella, house) for 25 seconds. After that, the
words disappeared from the screen and they had to write down as many words as they could
remember in the following 20 seconds.
2.2.2 Lotteries and Output
As indicated previously, each correct answer in a given task increased the probability of
the high output being realized. In each task and for each round we had variation in two
dimensions: the mapping of correct answers into the probability of the high output (i.e.,
the set of lotteries) and the level of the high output.8 These were randomly assigned and
orthogonal to each other.
The lotteries Given that the number of questions asked by task differed, the precise map-
ping of correct questions into the probability of the high output occurring changed by task.
However, the overarching feature across tasks was that the probability of the high output
was always increasing in the number of correct questions solved by the agent. Moreover, for
each task, we had two different mappings: The high and low calibrations. In the former, the
8The low output was always set equal to |0.
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probability of the high output started at 50% had the agent solved one question correctly
and, as the agent solved more questions correctly, it could exceed 90%, though it could never
reach 100%. In the latter, the probability of the high outcome started at 5% and could at
most reach 60% had the agent solved all questions correctly. We varied the mapping in order
to understand whether this feature affects payments, beliefs, and gender-biased attributions.
Output level The high output could take three different levels: |400, |550, or |700. We
vary the level of the high output to see whether principals’ payments and beliefs are affected
by the potential value of the high output. Importantly, both the agents and the principals
had access to this information in each round. Agents were shown the mapping and the output
level before they performed the task, while principals were shown this information at the time
the agents were performing the task. Both agents and principals were given unlimited time to
read and process the information, which was provided in table form for intuitive exposition
and ease of understanding.
2.3 Attribution Bias by Gender
Our experiment is designed to analyze whether principals make biased attributions regarding
the performance of the agents. In particular, to capture attribution bias, we designed an
environment in which outputs represent noisy signals of the agent’s performance. That is,
the output produced in each round is a function of the number of questions answered correctly
by the agent, but also luck. The principal therefore has to base her payment on the basis of
the lottery’s outcome.
In this environment, we test whether the gender of the agent plays a crucial role in
the principal’s payment and in shaping her beliefs about how much the agent’s competence
contributed to the output. In particular, our empirical tests follow directly from the concept
of attribution bias by gender. A principal exhibiting attribution bias by gender will attribute
a high output to the agent’s performance if male, while she will attribute it to luck if the
agent is female. Similarly, following a low output, the principal will attribute it to misfortune
if the agent is male while to performance if the agent is a female. Similarly, this difference
in the principal’s beliefs by gender would affect the way principals make their payments to
agents. We therefore implement the following tests:
1. We test whether the principal’s belief about the number of correctly solved questions is
higher for male as compared to female agents, following both high and low outputs.
2. We test whether the principal’s payments are higher for male agents as compared to
female agents, following both high and low outputs.
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3. We test whether the sensitivity of the principal’s beliefs about the number of correctly
solved questions and the sensitivity of the principal’s payments to the realization of
output differ for male agents as compared to female agents.
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in July 2018 in the computer lab at the Delhi School of
Economics. Invited participants belonged to the departments of Commerce, Economics, Ge-
ography, and Sociology. We recruited a total of 84 subjects and conducted 5 sessions that
lasted around 75 minutes each. The participants earned on average |510, which includes the
show-up fee of |250. We programmed the experiment with oTree (Chen et al., 2016).
We begin by examining agents’ performance and their beliefs in Section 3.2. In partic-
ular, we look at agents’ performance across tasks and by gender. In this section, we also
analyze agents’ beliefs about their own performance and their beliefs about their principals’
payment decisions. We then investigate principals’ payment decisions and their beliefs about
their agents’ performance in Section 3.3. We thus analyse whether principals make biased
attributions and payments depending on the gender of their matched agents. We present our
econometric specifications in Section 3.4, and the results of these estimations in Section 3.5.
In Section 3.6 we discuss alternative factors that might be driving our results: the salience
of gender information, principals’ prior beliefs about the agents’ performance, selection of
our sample, and whether principals’ payments are driven by other demographic information
about the agents such as age. Summary statistics are reported in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3
in Appendix A.
3.2 Agents
3.2.1 Agents’ Performance and their Beliefs
Performance The mean proportion of correctly answered questions across tasks was 39%
(s.d. 0.23). Performance, defined as the proportion of questions solved correctly, varies by
task: it is highest in the math and effort tasks with over 50% of questions solved correctly,
while it is lowest for the Raven task with 22% of answers correct. If we look at performance
broken down by gender in Table 1, we find no difference in performance by gender across
tasks.9
9There are also no significant differences in performances’ distributions nor in the variance of the number
of correct questions by gender and across tasks.
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Table 1: Mean performance by task and gender
All Agents Female Agents Male Agents P-value Difference
All Tasks 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.85
Math Task 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.73
Raven Task 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.62
Memory Task 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.85
Effort Task 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.81
Statistical significance is assessed by running regressions of performance (proportion of questions solved cor-
rectly) on the gender of the agent. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Beliefs about performance As can be seen in Table 2, agents’ beliefs about their own
performance differ by task, but there are no differences in beliefs by gender. If we compare
performance and beliefs, we can see that agents are overconfident in the math and the Raven
tasks. Indeed, they believe they have solved an excess of roughly 15% questions correctly.
Table 2: Mean beliefs about performance by task and gender
All Agents Female Agents Male Agents P-value Difference
All Tasks 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.41
Math Task 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.34
Raven Task 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.78
Memory Task 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.71
Effort Task 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.45
Statistical significance is assessed by running regressions of performance on the gender of the agent. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
3.2.2 Agents’ Beliefs about Outcomes and Expected Payments
Beliefs about realized outcomes and expected principals’ payments At the top of
Table 3, we look at agents’ beliefs about realized outcomes (i.e. the perceived probability that
the high outcome was realized) by gender and task. We find essentially the same patterns as
with beliefs about performance: agents are overconfident, but their beliefs do not differ by
gender. On the other hand, at the bottom of Table 3, we can see that female agents believe
that, on average, principals will allocate 59% of the |350 to them, while male agents believe
they will receive roughly 51%. However, the difference is not statistically significant.
In sum, we find that, while performance differs by task, it does not significantly differ by
agent gender. Similarly, beliefs about own performance and principals’ actions do not differ
by the gender of the agent. Male and female agents’ beliefs about principals actions differ
but not statistically significantly so.
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Table 3: Mean beliefs about realized outcomes and expected principals’ payments
All Agents Female Agents Male Agents P-value
Beliefs about Realized Outcomes
All Tasks 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.78
Math Task 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.87
Raven Task 0.65 0.62 0.68 0.47
Memory Task 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.71
Effort Task 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.72
Beliefs about Principals’ Payments
All Tasks 0.55 0.59 0.51 0.15
Math Task 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.74
Raven Task 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.66
Memory Task 0.61 0.68 0.49 0.03
Effort Task 0.0.55 0.65 0.47 0.23
Statistical significance is assessed by running regressions of either beliefs about realized outcomes or beliefs
about principals’ payments on the gender of the agent. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
3.3 Principals
We now turn to our main outcome variables: the principals’ payment decisions and beliefs.
We start by considering principals’ beliefs and choices depending on the outcome produced by
their agents. We then analyze these variables depending on the agent’s gender. Importantly,
in the following analysis we looked at pooled results that take into account all tasks and
calibrations. The outcome produced in each round is coded as 0 when the realized outcome
of the lottery was low (|0) and 1 if it was high (|400, |550, or |700).
3.3.1 Wages and Principals’ Beliefs
Wages In Figure 1, we show the distribution of principals’ payments depending on the
realized outcome. From the figure it is clear that payments depended heavily on the real-
ized outcome: higher payments were made following a high outcome and lower payments
were made following low outcomes. A Mann-Whitney test confirms that the distribution of
principals’ payments differs significantly by the realized outcome (p-value< 0.00).
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Figure 1: Principals’ payment decisions by realized outcome
Notes: the histograms show the distribution of principals’ payment decisions by realized outcome.
Beliefs Figure 2 shows that principals’ beliefs about their agents’ performance follow a
similar pattern. The principals’ beliefs here correspond to the proportion of questions that
they think the agents have solved correctly in a given round. Principals’ beliefs are higher
when the output is high as compared to when it is low. A Mann-Whitney test shows the the
distribution of principals’ beliefs differ significantly by the realized outcome (p-value< 0.00).
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Figure 2: Principals’ beliefs by realized outcome
Notes: the histograms show the distributions of principals’ beliefs about the matched agents’ performance by
realized outcome.
3.3.2 Wages and Principals’ Beliefs by the Gender of their Matched Agents
Wages by gender of the agent We now analyze whether there are differences in prin-
cipals’ wages depending on the gender of their matched agents. Figure 3 shows that, while
payments respond to the outcome of the lottery, they do not differentially respond by the
agents’ gender. Indeed, a Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the null hypotheses of equality in
distributions following either a low (p-value= 0.611) or a high outcome (p-value= 0.883).10
10In appendix B, we also show mean payments (from the separate pot) made to the other randomly matched
agent and to the experimenter by realized outcome and the gender of the agent.
14
Figure 3: Principals’ wages by realized outcome and agents’ gender
Notes: the histograms show the distribution of principals’ payment decisions by realized outcome and the
gender of the matched agents.
Beliefs by gender of the agent The results for beliefs match those for wages. Figure 4
shows that, while beliefs about the number of questions solved correctly are heavily influenced
by the realized outcome, they do not shift depending on the agent’s gender. Results of a
Mann-Whitney test show no significant difference in distributions irrespective of whether the
outcome is low or high (p-value=0.514 and p-value=0.884, respectively).
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Figure 4: Principals’ beliefs by realized outcome and agents’ gender
Notes: the histograms show the distributions of principals’ beliefs about the matched agents’ performance by
realized outcome and gender of the matched agents.
In sum, our experimental results do not provide evidence that principals’ payments deci-
sions and beliefs are influenced by their agent’s gender.
3.4 Econometric Specifications
We next conduct parametric analyses to further analyze the variables affecting the principals’
payment decisions. In particular, we estimate the following regression:
(1) Yij = β0 + β1Zijr + β2Femalei + β3Femalei × Zijr + x′ijrβ4 + ij
Here, i is the agent, j is the principal and r is the round, Yij is the dependent variable. This
is either the principal’s payment to the agent or her belief about the agent’s performance. Zijr
is a dummy for a high outcome in the lottery produced by agent i matched with principal
j in round r, Femalei is a dummy equal to 1 if the agent is a female. xijr is a vector of
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controls that includes principals’ demographic variables (age, caste, religion, field of study,
education level, and state of birth) and task characteristics (task, calibration of the lottery,
and level of the high outcome). We report standard errors clustered at the principal level in
all specifications. β2 captures whether there are any average differences in payments made
to female versus male agents when the outcome produced is low, while β3 captures if there
is any difference in the increase in the payment made to female agents in response to a high
outcome, compared to the increase for male agents.
We then also control for the principal’s gender to check whether this variable plays any
role in the payments made to the agent. We estimate this using the following econometric
specification:
Yij = β0 + β1Zijr + β2Femalei + β3Femalei × Zijr+
β4Femalej + β5Femalej × Zijr + x′ijrβ6 + ij
(2)
Femalej is a dummy equal to 1 if principal j was a female. β4 captures if there are any
average differences in payments made by male versus female principals in the case of a low
outcome (holding everything else constant), while β5 captures whether there is any difference
in the increase in payments made by female principals in response to the high outcome,
relative to the increase made by male principals. Our random matching design also allows us
to test for an interaction between agent’s gender and the principal’s gender. Hence we also
report estimates from the following specification:
Yij = β0 + β1Zijr + β2Femalei + β3Femalei × Zijr + β4Femalej
+β5Femalej × Zijr + β6SameGenderij + x′ijrβ7 + ij
(3)
β6 here captures whether being matched to an agent of the same gender leads to any
differential effect on payments made by principals.
3.5 Econometric Results
The results for principals’ payment decisions (mean |184 and s.d.107.15) are shown in Table 4.
As is apparent from columns 1 to 4, the outcome of the lottery is important in determining the
payment made to the agent.11 Going from a low to a high outcome increases the principal’s
payment to the agent by around |100 in all specifications. On the other hand, the agent’s
gender does not play a role. The coefficient on the female dummy and the interaction with
the outcome variable are both insignificant and small. The coefficient on the female agent
11The number of observations is 804 because in two sessions we had 9 rounds per task and hence 18 rounds
instead of 20. This gives us 180, 160, 140, 162 and 162 observations for each session.
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Table 4: Regression results for principal’s payments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 101.57∗∗∗ 101.59∗∗∗ 112.79∗∗∗ 110.01∗∗∗
(14.38) (17.59) (33.53) (33.47)
Female Agent 1.92 1.31 10.01
(9.25) (9.06) (9.54)
Female Agent × High Outcome -0.04 0.96 -0.27
(13.20) (12.41) (12.54)
Female Principal -34.15 -33.59
(40.89) (39.92)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
dummy varies between |1 and |10 across specifications, compared to the average of the
dependent variable, which is |184. Thus, principals did not make payments differently to
women as compared to men conditional on the same outcome. We do not, then, find evidence
of attribution bias by gender. An F-test for whether the total effect of a high outcome
on payments made to female agents is similar to that made to men cannot be rejected (p
value=0.736).
If we perform the same regressions for beliefs (mean 0.54 and s.d. 0.26), we find the same
patterns. Table 5 shows that principals’ beliefs are significantly shaped by outcomes while
they are not affected by agent gender. Female principals are more likely to believe that agents
solved a smaller proportion of questions correctly in case of a low outcome while they increase
their beliefs significantly more than the male principals in response to a high outcome. Their
payments react less than those of male principals, as seen in Table 4, though this difference
is not significant.
Thus, we find that a high outcome leads to a smaller increase increase in payments for
female agents, a difference equivalent to roughly 2% of the outcome mean. In comparison
to our results, Sarsons (2019) finds that the increase in referrals was 17% less for women
after a positive outcome, while Selody (2010) shows that the growth rate in female executive
pay is 25% lower than that of male executives after their company faces an unexpected good
outcome. Similarly following a low outcome, we find that there is a statistically insignificant
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Table 5: Regression results for principal’s beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Agent 0.02 0.03 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female Agent × Outcome -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Principal -0.13∗∗ -0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
and larger payment made to female agents equivalent to 1.3% of the mean. Egan et al. (2017),
by contrast, finds a 20% higher likelihood of punishment for women following a misconduct
incident, while Selody (2010) estimates a decrease in top executive pay of about 68% for
women relative to men after a negative change in the firm’s market value. These differences
in results could be due to differences in outcome variables. Nevertheless, we also measure
beliefs and we find that, while there is a smaller increase in beliefs about ability for women
than men after a high outcome, the difference is insignificant and is roughly 9% of the belief
mean. Thus, we find no evidence of biased beliefs by gender.
While the gender of the agent alone does not influence payments, its interaction with the
principal’s gender does and significantly so as in column 4 of Table 4. In particular, principals
payments are significantly higher to agents of the opposite gender, irrespective of the realized
outcome. In other words, principals pay around |17 less to their matched agents if they
belong to the same gender. In Table 5, with beliefs as the outcome variable, we find that the
coefficient on same gender is negative, in line with the evidence for payments, however, this
is not significant.
Taken together, our results show that principals’ beliefs and payment decisions are heavily




3.6.1 Session and Round Fixed Effects
In the appendix, we show that our results on principals’ payments are robust to including
session fixed effects (see Table C.4) and round fixed effects (see Table C.5). Running regres-
sions without controls shows that the main result on principals’ payments is robust to not
including controls (see Table C.6). The results regarding the same gender of the principal and
agent also continue to hold. Similarly, the main results for beliefs are also robust to including
session fixed effects (see Table C.7) and round fixed effects (see Table C.8). Results without
controls are similar in magnitude and significance, as shown in Table C.9.
3.6.2 Restricting the Sample to the First Ten Rounds
If principals’ beliefs in early rounds are more biased than in later rounds, for example if
they have not yet been influenced by observing the realized outcomes, then it is possible that
attribution bias by gender was only present in the initial rounds of the experiment. To test for
this, we report similar regressions restricting the sample to the first ten rounds in Tables C.10
and C.11. The results for attribution bias by gender hold as for the rest of the sample. The
coefficient on the female agent dummy stays small relative to the mean payment of |184. The
coefficient on the interaction of the female dummy with the high outcome dummy is negative
but still small and statistically insignificant. For the case of payments, the coefficient on
same gender becomes larger by |7 than the estimate obtained using the whole sample. In
Table C.11, high outcomes no longer make female principals update their beliefs significantly
more than males. The results for attribution bias by gender, however, are the same and there
is no significant effect of being matched with a female agent on the beliefs of the principal
after a high or a low outcome. In summary, we do not find evidence that attribution bias by
gender arises even in the initial rounds of the experiment.
3.6.3 Removing the First Five Rounds from the Sample
We further look at the results after removing the first five rounds of each session to account
for the possibility that participants may not have fully understood the experiment in the first
few rounds. In Tables C.12 and Table C.13, we can see that there is no evidence of attribution
bias by gender. The coefficients on the female agent dummy become larger than in the main
results, but are still statistically insignificant and small in comparison to the mean of the
outcome variable. The coefficient for same gender remains large and significant. Thus our
results do not appear to be driven by principals not understanding the experiment in the
initial five rounds.
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3.6.4 Alternative Dependent Variables
To evaluate whether attribution bias manifests in changes in the shape of the payment distri-
bution, we have estimated Equation (1) using alternative definitions of the dependent variable.
We thus estimate the following econometric specification:
(4) Yijx = β0 + β1Zijr + β2Femalei + β3Femalej + x
′
ijrβ3 + ij
This equation is the same as the one in Equation (1) except that the dependent variable Yijx
is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the payment to the agent takes a value greater
than or equal to x. We vary x from |50 to |300 in increments of |50. The estimates are
shown in Table C.14. For all these different cutoffs, we find similar results in that the gender
of the agent does not play any role in driving payments.
3.6.5 Results for Different Tasks
We show in Table C.15 that our results are not driven by any one task. In particular, if
tasks that are known to be male stereotypical could lead to attribution bias, we would find
attribution bias for these tasks. However, the coefficients on female agent and its interaction
with high outcome remain small in comparison to the coefficient on high outcome across all
tasks. The coefficient on female agent interacted with high outcome becomes significant at
10% level for the memory task, though the coefficient is now positive. Similarly, in Table C.16
we find that there is no significant effect of the female dummy on the beliefs of principals and
that coefficients remain small relative to effect of a high outcome on beliefs across tasks.
4 Possible Threats
4.1 Irrelevance of Payments
Given that the principals’ payments were made from a separate pot of money, and thus they
were payoff-irrelevant for the principals, one possible explanation for the results could be
that these payments did not vary or were chosen randomly. However, the results of section
3.3.1 show that this was not the case: principals understood that their choices had economic
implications for their matched agents and were responsive to the realized value of output.
4.2 Gender Information
Our lack of experimental evidence for attribution bias by gender could be explained by the
way in which we disclosed gender information about the agents. A failure to find attribution
bias by gender could be driven by the possibility that principals understood that our research
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question was about gender discrimination and, therefore, they were particularly cautious in
preventing such bias from arising during the experiment (e.g., due to a social desirability
bias). However, when subjects in the role of principals were asked to guess our research
questions at the end of the experiment,12 none guessed it was about gender. The most
common guesses included answers such as: “the sharing tendency of people”, “a study on
how individual decision making is affected when their possible returns are contingent on the
actions of another person”, and “assessing contracts”.13
Alternatively, one might worry that displaying gender information using nicknames is not
salient enough to induce gender discrimination. While this is a possible interpretation of our
results, if it were indeed the case that principals did not pay attention to the gender of the
agent, that would itself be a finding. This would imply that principals did not judge that this
piece of information was important in making their payments and attributions. Further, the
results regarding the principals’ gender in interaction with the gender of the agents shows
that principals did pay attention to the agent’s gender. In other words, this result provides
evidence that information about the agent’s gender was salient and principals did take it into
account, although not in a manner consistent with attribution bias by gender.
4.3 Prior Beliefs by Gender of the Agent
In two sessions, we also elicited principals’ beliefs about the agents’ performance prior to any
knowledge regarding the realized outcome. While prior beliefs that principals have are slightly
higher for male agents than for female agents (70% of questions solved correctly vs. 67%),
the difference is not statistically significant (p-value= 0.29). We therefore do not believe that
our results are driven by differences in prior beliefs.
4.4 Selection of our Sample
Since we conducted experimental sessions at the Delhi School of Economics, one may wonder
whether our “null” results might be driven by sample selection: women at this university may
be positively selected relative to the population, which would affect how principals behave.
Two considerations are worth emphasizing. First, it is not the case that they did better on the
tasks than male participants. Second, our sample of positively selected females resembles the
same samples (e.g. highly educated female physicians, CEOs) in which observational studies
have found patterns consistent with attribution bias by gender.
12In particular, we asked the following open-text question: “Please, guess what our research questions are.”
13Importantly, our subject pool was new to experiments. Therefore, they were not aware that in standard
experiments subjects’ personal characteristics (such as nicknames and age) are not usually disclosed.
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4.5 Agents’ Ages
When we showed gender information about the agent, we also showed the principal the age
of the agent as a way to mask our research question. We chose age in particular given the
relatively small variation in age among university students. We can check therefore whether
payments and beliefs are affected by this piece of information. That is, we can test whether
the principal’s payments and beliefs are driven by the agent’s age. When we run the same
regressions as before, replacing gender with age in the set of control variables, we find that
neither the agent’s age nor that of the principal affect payments or beliefs (see Tables C.17
and C.18).
5 Conclusion
Recent literature has suggested that a particular form of discrimination – attribution bias
by gender – might affect assessments of actors’ outcomes in economic environments. We
conduct a laboratory experiment to test for this effect. Our results do not show evidence
consistent with attribution bias by gender. While in our experiment principals’ beliefs and
payments are influenced by realized outcomes, we find no evidence that they differ by the
agent’s gender. With the caveat that we have a relatively small sample size, our findings
suggest that attribution bias by gender does not arise in a controlled environment. However
our findings need not imply that attribution bias by gender does not play a role in real-world
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A Appendix A: Summary Statistics















Other/Prefer not say 0.00 0.07
(0.00) (0.26)
Year of study
1st year MA 0.07 0.07
(0.26) (0.26)












Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics (in means) of the experimental dataset. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Female is the share of female participants. Age is the reported age of the participant. Degree
of study: 1=Sociology, 2=Commerce, 3=Geography, 4=Economics, 5=Other. Year of study: 1=First year
master degree, 2=Second year master degree, 3=Master of philosophy (mphil), 4=PhD, 5=Other. Language:
1=English, 2=Other.
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Other/Prefer not say 0.02 0.00
(0.15) (0.00)
Caste
Scheduled caste 0.07 0.12
(0.26) (0.33)
Scheduled tribe 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)




Other/Prefer not say 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
N 42 42
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics (in means) of the experimental dataset. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Religion: 1=Muslim, 2=Hindu, 3=Sikh, 4=Christian, 5=Buddhist, 6=Parsi, 7=Other, 8=Prefer
not say. Caste: 1=Scheduled caste, 2=Scheduled tribe, 3=Other backward castes, 4=General, 5=Other,
6=Prefer not say.
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Table A.3: Summary statistics of variables in main econometric specification
Mean Standard Deviation
High Outcome 0.45 0.50
Female Agent 0.55 0.50
Female Agent × High Outcome 0.25 0.43
Female Principal 0.73 0.44
Female Principal × High Outcome 0.32 0.47
Same Gender 0.55 0.50
N 804 804
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics of the corresponding variables.
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B Appendix B
B.1 Mean Payments to Each Party by Realized Outcome
In the paper we have analysed principals’ payment decisions to their matched agents following
low and high outcomes. Here, we now present a visual representation of average payments to
each party following both low and high outcomes (see Figure B.1). This figure shows that,
going from a low to a high outcome, principals’ payments to their matched agent increase
(from |135.15 to |243.35) whereas payments decrease to both the other randomly drawn
agent (from |120.37 to |75.99) and to the experimenter (from |94.48 to |30.66).
Figure B.1: Mean payments to each party by realized outcome
B.2 Mean Payments to Each Party by Realized Outcome and Gender of
the Agent
If we look at mean payments by taking into account the gender of the matched agent, we
find very similar patterns (Figure B.2). Indeed, while agents (irrespective of their gender)
are rewarded for high outcomes, this comes at the cost of lower payments to both the other
randomly matched agent and the experimenter.
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Figure B.2: Mean payments to each party by realized outcome and gender of the agent
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C Appendix C
C.1 Robustness Checks for Principals’ Payment Decisions and Beliefs
Table C.4: Regression results for principals’ payments with session fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 101.64∗∗∗ 102.27∗∗∗ 114.19∗∗∗ 112.27∗∗∗
(14.80) (18.17) (33.43) (33.39)
Female Agent 3.27 2.74 8.61
(9.08) (8.69) (9.30)
Female Agent × High Outcome -1.09 -0.17 -0.96
(13.31) (12.43) (12.50)
Female Principal -34.96 -34.49
(36.85) (36.53)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Session fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
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Table C.5: Regression results for principals’ payments with round fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 101.25∗∗∗ 99.94∗∗∗ 111.83∗∗∗ 109.31∗∗∗
(14.05) (17.39) (32.71) (32.76)
Female Agent 0.92 0.31 8.64
(9.60) (9.40) (9.67)
Female Agent × High Outcome 2.39 3.31 2.08
(13.45) (12.67) (12.85)
Female Principal -33.23 -32.75
(41.41) (40.53)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Round fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
Table C.6: Regression results for principals’ payments without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 108.21∗∗∗ 104.21∗∗∗ 116.58∗∗∗ 113.76∗∗∗
(14.72) (18.76) (33.33) (33.61)
Female Agent -4.81 -1.34 7.22
(11.45) (11.79) (11.49)
Female Agent × High Outcome 7.33 3.70 2.35
(16.98) (16.16) (16.28)
Female Principal -27.71 -29.09
(29.27) (29.01)




R-Squared 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.28
N 804 804 804 804
No controls are added to the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
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Table C.7: Regression results for principals’ beliefs with session fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Agent 0.02 0.03 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female Agent × High Outcome -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Principal -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Session fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
Table C.8: Regression results for principals’ beliefs with round fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Agent 0.02 0.03 0.04∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Female Agent × High Outcome -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Principal -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Session fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
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Table C.9: Regression results for principals’ beliefs without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Female Agent 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Agent × High Outcome -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Female Principal -0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
N 804 804 804 804
No controls are included in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
Table C.10: Regression results for principals’ payments for the first ten rounds only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 100.94∗∗∗ 101.99∗∗∗ 117.64∗∗∗ 111.16∗∗∗
(15.54) (18.85) (38.08) (39.91)
Female Agent 0.52 -0.23 12.34
(15.60) (16.29) (20.80)
Female Agent × High Outcome -1.93 -1.19 -1.13
(20.34) (20.77) (21.11)
Female Principal -22.24 -19.78
(47.32) (46.91)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33
N 420 420 420 420
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Results for only the initial 10 rounds are shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
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Table C.11: Regression results for principals’ beliefs for the first ten rounds only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Female Agent 0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Agent × High Outcome -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Female Principal -0.15∗ -0.15∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33
N 420 420 420 420
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Results for only the initial 10 rounds are shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
Table C.12: Regression results for principals’ payments after removing the first five rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 109.94∗∗∗ 117.91∗∗∗ 129.97∗∗∗ 128.10∗∗∗
(15.05) (18.59) (32.08) (31.87)
Female Agent 7.11 5.49 15.25
(11.03) (10.72) (10.36)
Female Agent × High Outcome -14.39 -11.97 -13.21
(14.31) (13.42) (13.51)
Female Principal -36.68 -35.99
(41.01) (39.37)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38
N 594 594 594 594
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. First five rounds were removed for regressions
above. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
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Table C.13: Regression results for principals’ beliefs after removing the first five rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Agent 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female Agent × High Outcome 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Female Principal -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.38
N 594 594 594 594
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Results above are shown after removing first five
rounds of the sessions. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
Table C.14: Regression results for alternative definition of dependent variable
(≥ 50) (≥100) (≥150) (≥200) (≥250) (≥300)
High Outcome 0.21∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Female Agent -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Female Agent × High Outcome 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
Mean 0.81 0.72 0.62 0.36 0.24 0.12
Demographics X X X X X X
Task Controls X X X X X X
R-Squared 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27
N 804 804 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Task controls are dummy variables for each task. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table C.15: Regression results for principals’ payments for different tasks
(Maths) (Ravens) (Memory) (Effort)
High Outcome 97.21∗∗∗ 101.38∗∗∗ 72.94∗∗ 160.58∗∗∗
(23.15) (26.68) (30.53) (20.42)
Female Agent -0.79 2.72 -13.01 16.10
(21.43) (13.08) (15.50) (17.57)
Female Agent × High Outcome 0.24 7.39 46.14∗ -15.45
(25.83) (23.88) (25.17) (14.78)
Demographics X X X X
R-Squared 0.29 0.29 0.55 0.85
N 312 252 150 90
Each column depicts results for a regression of principal payments for the particular task mentioned in the
heading. Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level,
and field of study. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
Table C.16: Regression results for principals’ beliefs for different tasks
(Maths) (Ravens) (Memory) (Effort)
High Outcome 0.17∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Female Agent -0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Female Agent × High Outcome 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Demographics X X X X
R-Squared 0.22 0.37 0.42 0.63
N 312 252 150 90
Each column depicts results for a regression of principal beliefs for the particular task mentioned in the heading.
Demographic variables include: principal’s age, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and field
of study. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level.
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C.2 Principals’ Payment Decisions and Beliefs by Agents’ Age
Table C.17: Regression results for principal’s payments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 102.18∗∗∗ 101.18∗∗∗ 96.45∗∗∗ 96.31∗∗∗
(14.35) (17.42) (20.32) (20.31)
Age Agent -4.32 -4.94 -4.45
(9.97) (9.52) (9.36)
Age Agent × High Outcome 1.51 -1.06 -1.00
(12.98) (12.90) (12.96)
Age Principal 21.42 21.53
(26.17) (26.18)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s gender, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and
field of study. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level. The agent’s and principal’s age variables
are dummy variables. The “Age Agent” variable is equal to 1 if the agent’s age is above or equal to the median
agents’ age and 0 otherwise. The “Age Principal” variable is equal to 1 if the principal’s age is above to the
median principals’ age and 0 otherwise.
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Table C.18: Regression results for principal’s beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Outcome 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age Agent -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age Agent × Outcome 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age Principal 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.07)




Demographics X X X X
Task Controls X X X X
R-Squared 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31
N 804 804 804 804
Demographic variables include: principal’s gender, religion, caste, main language, state, education level, and
field of study. Standard errors are clustered at the principal level. The agent’s and principal’s age variables
are dummy variables. The “Age Agent” variable is equal to 1 if the agent’s age is above or equal to the median
agents’ age and 0 otherwise. The “Age Principal” variable is equal to 1 if the principal’s age is above to the
median principals’ age and 0 otherwise.
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